THE CORPORATION AS GOD
Corporate scholarship is dominated by the law and economics movement.1 This provides
a useful framework for understanding the economic functions of the modern corporation, but it
has precious little to say about the social and cultural meaning of the corporation. Just as
nuclear physicists can explain the workings of an atomic bomb but not what it means for the
human race, the proponents of law and economics can describe the economics of the corporation
but not its broader meaning within our culture. To fully understand the corporation we must pass
beyond economics to the fields of anthropology and cultural criticism, viewing the corporation in
the same way that we would view other cultural institutions and practices. In other words, we
must extend “the cultural study of law” to corporations.2
From the perspective of cultural theory, I will argue that the modern corporation is
fundamentally a religious and mythological entity – to put it bluntly, the corporation is a secular
God and corporate law is a secular religion. This means that we must take seriously (and then
deconstruct) Henry Ford’s statement that, “There is something sacred about a big business,”3 and
we must see the hidden truth in Nehru’s famous quip that, “Dams are the temples of modern
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India.”4

Although the business world is typically thought to be a realm of hard-headed

pragmatism and real-world practicality, it rests upon fundamentally religious and mythological
notions. At the core of both corporate law and religion is an invisible and hard-to-define entity
(‘God,’ or ‘the corporation’) which miraculously becomes ‘in-corporated’ and ‘made flesh.’5
Just as priests and rabbis spend their lives divining God’s will, corporate directors and officers
dedicate themselves to serving the ‘best interests of the corporation.’ We may ridicule the socalled pagan who carves a deity from a chunk of wood and then imbues it with magical powers,
yet lawyers do much the same thing when they file papers with the secretary of state to create an
invisible and artificial entity whom they serve.6 And no one can deny that the cult of worship
surrounding business leaders (such as Donald Trump) has an unmistakably religious undertone.
The connection between business and religion calls out for an explanation.
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In what follows I want to draw a parallel between the corporation and God, and then
analyze corporate law as a system of mythology. For reasons that will become clear, I tend to
follow the critical theory approach (with roots in Marxism) which sees mythology as an attempt
to resolve underlying contradictions in a culture and to legitimate systemic injustices that would
otherwise seem objectionable.

I will argue that corporate law serves these two purposes

(mediation and legitimation) by papering over the smoldering class contradictions in American
culture and by lending a veneer of legitimacy to the structural inequalities of the marketplace.
The corporation is essentially a magical and mysterious entity that smooths over the
contradictions in our culture and makes inequities seem natural.

The Corporation as God
There is an odd parallel between the modern corporation and the God of monotheism in
that both are ephemeral beings that resist definition. The National Catholic Almanac defines
God as,
almighty,

eternal,

holy,

immortal,

immense,

immutable,

incomprehensible, ineffable, infinite, invisible, just, loving,
merciful, most high, most wise, omnipotent, omniscient,
omnipresent, patient, perfect, provident, supreme, true.7

In similar language, Justice Marshall once defined the corporation as “an artificial being,
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invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law,”8 to which we would now add
‘capable of perpetual existence,’ ‘with potentially unlimited size,’ ‘capable of residing
anywhere.’ Indeed, corporations are noteworthy for the absence of qualities; the only persistent
quality of the modern corporation is limited liability, that is, the absence of a quality that would
otherwise apply to an actual person.
What is this abstract ‘corporation’ that magically comes into being when paperwork is
filed with the secretary of state? No one seems to know. In fact, the struggle to define the
corporation is a problem dating back to the dawn of the modern corporation. Writing in the
1920s, professor Maurice Wormser (author of Frankenstein Incorporated, a cautionary analysis
of the modern corporation) said, “Just what the corporation is, no two legal authorities are in
accord.”9 A typical treatise from the dawn of the century gave an unwieldy definition running
eighty words.10 Law dictionaries simply define it as an entity distinct from shareholders without
saying precisely what this means.11 The courts have referred to the corporation as a “robot,”12 a
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“set of contractual relations and entitlements,”13 a “fictional person,”14 and an “incorporeal,
artificial creature of the law.”15 Most contemporary corporate codes resort to circular definitions:
for example, the Ohio corporate statutes define a corporation as “a corporation for profit formed
under the laws of this state.”16 In other words, ‘a corporation is a corporation is a corporation.’
This is the same problem that theologians face. If they list an affirmative quality as an
attribute of God (say, patience) then it might contradict a different quality that they would also
like to include (say, swiftness). Philosopher George Smith explains the dilemma:
On the one hand they favor a notion of a supernatural being, a
being without restrictions, a being of infinite nature. On the other
hand, they want a god with characteristics, a god that can be
identified.

But this enterprise is doomed from the start.

An

unlimited attribute is a contradiction in terms.17
In other words, theologians want God to be both infinite and finite, human and divine, forgiving
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yet just, merciful yet vengeful, permissive of human freedom yet capable of divine intervention
when necessary. All of these attributes are stuffed into the concept of ‘God’ to the point where it
becomes a ball of contradictions. When the question arises of how a single being can have so
many contradictory attributes, the matter simply gets pushed further back by asserting that it is
all a giant mystery. The problem, again, is that we place so many contradictory demands on God
that we render the entire concept contradictory. The solution is to create a catch-all, vague
concept that subsumes all attributes. In the end we are back in the book of Exodus where God
tells Moses, “I

AM WHO

I

AM

. . . Thus you will tell the Israelites, I

AM

has sent me to you.”18

This is precisely what the Model Business Corporation Act provides when it defines a
corporation as “a corporation for profit, which is not a foreign corporation, incorporated under or
subject to the provisions of this Act.”19
The bottom line is that no one knows for certain what a corporation is. This would not be
a problem except for the fact that most controversies in corporate law ultimately turn on what
type of being the corporation is. For example, is it a democracy? A member of the community?
A profit- driven machine? A rights-bearer? A taxpayer? An economic relation? Or is it simply
nothing?
Just as theologians cannot agree on whether God exists in physical space or is merely a
concept, legal scholars cannot agree on whether a corporation is an entity or a nexus of
contracts.20 On the one hand, corporations own land, hire workers, file lawsuits, and so forth, so
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they would seem to be entities; and indeed the corporate statutes refer to the corporation as a
“body corporate,” implying the existence of an actual entity.21 On the other hand, there is no
specific thing that can be isolated as ‘the corporation’ – if one goes to a corporate headquarters
one sees only people milling about, which suggests that talk about an entity is tantamount to
speaking of a ghost in the machine. For this reason, legal scholars nowadays tend to view the
corporation as a nexus of contracts among shareholders, managers, bondholders, employees and
suppliers.22 Courts and treatises are equally divided on the entity/nexus question: some insist
that the corporation has a “real existence [but] no physical existence,”23 that it is an “artificial
being”24 that exists “only on paper.”25 Others say that it possesses “real individuality”26 and is a
“person” but not an “individual” under certain statutes.27
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Obviously, questions of corporate ontology cannot be settled empirically, that is, we
cannot simply look at the modern corporation and decide whether it is a nexus or an entity, since
these are not observable features but competing interpretations and models of the modern
corporation. My point is simply that a full century after its emergence, we are still unsure about
what the corporation is.
The analogy with God is bolstered by the manner in which the corporation, like God,
subsumes contradictory attributes. If we say that the modern corporation is wholly rapacious, we
are reminded that a corporation can take charitable actions; if we say that the corporation has no
loyalty to the community, we are reminded of that corporations may choose to remain in a
community even if it hurts the bottom line; if we say that corporations are private entities, we are
reminded that they exist by charter from the government; if we insist that they are taxpaying
citizens, we are reminded that they can move offshore to avoid taxation; if we insist that they are
persons under the law, we are reminded that they can live forever and cannot be threatened with
physical harm or incarceration; if we say that they have the constitutional right to give perks to
politicians, we are reminded that they cannot vote.
The puzzles surrounding the modern corporation are magnified by the elasticity of the
corporate form. That is, generalizing about corporations can be tricky because they come in so
many different forms and can be designed (and managed) in just about any way. Indeed, critics
have long complained that corporate law is trivial because it permits so much freedom in
designing the modern corporation.28 That is, aside from a few minor requirements – minimum
28
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capital, a registered office in the state, one class of common stock – the remaining terms are left
up to the discretion of the incorporators who design the articles of incorporation and the bylaws.
For example, the modern corporation can be funded with billions or with a few thousand dollars;
it can have fifteen directors or one director (or even zero directors if the shareholders agree); it
can have several classes of stocks or it can have a single class of stock; it can have extensive
takeover defenses or no defenses whatsoever; it can have a limited purpose or any purpose
whatsoever; it can have straight voting or cumulative voting; and so forth.29

This elasticity is

precisely what creates a stalemate in most debates surrounding the American corporation, since
the very concept is indeterminate and contradictory.
If I am correct that the modern corporation is an inherently mythical figure, then
corporate law is best understood as a mythological narrative concerned with the life of this deity
– its birth, organic change, governance and death. Like other areas of law, corporate law is
grounded in foundational narratives and myths, or in the words of Robert Cover, “For every
constitution there is an epic; for every decalogue a scripture.”30 Just as the Bible is premised on

towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.”)
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God’s existence, corporate law is premised on the existence of an invisible, intangible, immortal
being whose “best interests” are to be discerned by a team of directors and officers, much in the
same way that priests try to discern God’s will.31 Beyond the mythical figure of the corporation,
there are a number of myths at the heart of corporate law.

For example, consider the

longstanding myth of “corporate democracy,” a term used repeatedly by the Delaware courts.32
A recent study by Professor Bebchuk of Harvard Law School found that corporations are
extremely undemocratic in that management’s candidates ran unopposed in over 99% of
elections.33 After comparing the rhetoric of corporate democracy with the reality of one-party
rule, Bebchuck concluded morosely that, “Although shareholder power to replace directors is

includes not only a corpus juris, but also a language and a mythos – narratives in which the corpus juris is
located . . .” Id.
31
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supposed to be an important element of our corporate governance system, it is largely a myth.”34
Bebchuk’s use of the word myth is telling. One needn’t look very far to find other myths
running through corporate law.

For example, Delaware courts have long insisted that a

corporation’s articles of incorporation and bylaws constitute a voluntary contract between
shareholders and the corporation,35 even though most shareholders wouldn’t know where to
locate these documents and have no idea what they contain. This can be seen as a myth of
consensus.

Another myth involves the widespread belief that corporations are transparent

because they report all material information to the Securities and Exchange Commission. In
reality, almost no one can decipher these documents, and even the head of the SEC was unable to
comprehend the disclosure documents for mutual funds when federal law required him to invest
in mutual funds.36 This is a myth of transparency. Another cluster of myths surround the
‘annual meeting,’ a term that implies a forum for deliberative discussion between management
and shareholders. In reality, these meetings are pre-scripted and mechanical affairs purposely
designed to avoid meaningful discourse, to avoid any genuine meeting with shareholders.37
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Finally, the greatest myth of corporate law is that the corporation is a ‘person,’38 and according
to some courts, a person with a particular race,39 while also remaining invisible, intangible,
immortal, and unrestricted as to size or purpose. Upon close examination, then, the hardheaded
and sober world of corporate law turns out to be invested and occupied with mythical
constructions.
In pointing out these myths, it is not my goal to heap ridicule on corporate law as
somehow primitive or groundless. As far as I know, corporate law is no more nor less imbued
with myth than any other area of law. Rather, I want to take seriously the notion that some
aspects of corporate law are best explained not as the result of economic forces, but as the result
of cultural forces. To do this, I will look at the reigning corporate myths and try to figure out
why they exist. What precisely is accomplished by these myths? Who stands to gain from them,
and why? Is there any underlying logic or structure to the corporate mythology? And is it even
possible – or desirable – to have corporate law without myths?
I approach these questions from the framework of critical theory, especially the work of
Marx, Nietzsche, Levi-Strauss, and Barthes, all of whom insist that myths pervade Western
culture (and law) despite our tendency to relegate myth to other, primitive cultures and epochs.
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According to these thinkers, myths have two functions – mediation and legitimation.40 The first
function (mediation) takes place on a very abstract level, where myths are formulated as a
conceptual working-through of contradictions that cannot be resolved at the level of material life,
so they are resolved on a symbolic level. To use a nonlegal example, the Greek figure of
Achilles can be read as a mediation between opposing forces in the Greek worldview such as
freedom/fate, life/death, and divine/human: Achilles was half-human and half-nymph, educated
by a centaur, and endowed with both human vulnerability and divine invincibility after being
dipped in the river Styx which separates this life from the afterlife.41 The opposition of life/death
cannot be mediated in real life (people do not die and return to life) but the myth offers a
symbolic resolution of the conceptual oppositions by integrating them into a coherent narrative.
In the same way, a legal concept such as ‘the corporation’ can function as a mediator between
opposing cultural oppositions such as public/private, individual/collective, profit/justice,
owners/workers, and so on. The myth is pregnant, as it were, with the underlying contradictions
of the culture, or to put it differently, the myth is a mirror into which we gaze to learn about
ourselves.
Myth’s second function (legitimation) takes place on a more practical level, where myths
naturalize and reify what are essentially contingent regimes of power, thereby disabling
criticism. An historical example might be the ‘divine right of kings’ as invoked to support royal
prerogative, or the myth that we have reached the ‘end of history’ characterized by liberal
40
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democracy and a free market.42
Corporate law can be seen as a vast mythology that serves the functions of mediation and
legitimation. In its role as a mediating force, corporate law bridges the chasm between two
inconsistent aspects of the corporation – it is both an economic set of relations as well as a social
actor. We need the engine of large corporations for our nation to prosper as an industrial
powerhouse, and yet we are appalled when these corporations engage in antisocial behavior in
search of profits. Corporate law resolves this tension (‘defuses’ would be more accurate) by
creating a vague, hollow, catch-all entity of mythical proportions that subsumes these
contradictory demands for profit and justice. As an empty signifier, the corporation is all things
to all people: it is a frugal profit-maximizer yet it doles out princely salaries to managers; it is
‘publicly-held’ yet has no enforceable obligations to the community; it is a democracy yet it
holds uncontested elections; its ‘transparency’ is based on public filings that are indecipherable;
it is a taxpaying citizen yet it can move overseas to avoid taxation; it is a person with
Constitutional rights yet it cannot vote; it is subject to criminal law yet cannot be put into prison.
In short, the corporation is at war with itself; it is a fictional entity and a contested terrain where
contradictions of the culture play out. This tension is illustrated by our love-hate attitude toward
corporations, for example, in the fact that the largest American corporation (Wal-Mart) is
simultaneously the most admired and most hated company in America.43
42
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As a force of legitimation, corporate law lays down a thick rhetorical gloss to convey the
impression that corporate governance is a realm of procedure, fairness, consensus, and business
judgment. The indignant American who is appalled at mass layoffs, overseas sweatshops,
insider deals, tax avoidance, toxic products, overzealous lobbying, and mistreatment of workers
can find little leverage in the corporate law to combat such practices, and for good reason:
prohibiting these behaviors would grind much corporate behavior to a halt. Corporate law is a
symbolic gesture, an apologia, a simulation, a parallel universe standing above the realpolitik of
corporate practice, where the behavior that shocks our conscience is christened as ‘legal’ and
seemingly accords with our commitments to justice and democracy. Corporate law is an official
story written by insiders to correspond with their notion of what modern capitalism should look
like. In this way, corporate law ratifies, enables, and sanctifies a corporate system of property
holdings which leads to vast inequalities of power and shocking concentrations of capital in a
few hands.
Thinking about law as a species of mythology requires that we move beyond the
currently dominant framework for understanding corporate law, namely the law and economics
movement. The economic approach must be supplemented with an understanding of corporate
law as a system of signs – we must pay attention to myths, rituals, ceremonies, consecrations,
and corporate folklore. Corporate law is not just about dollars and cents but about meaning, so
we can never fully grasp the corporation by viewing it solely through the lens of economic
theory. To make this point, I will begin with a general discussion of myth and its relation to law,
and then I will look specifically at the myths of corporate law.
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Myth and its Relation to Law
The English term “myth” derives from the Greek mythos, a multivalent term which
originally meant ‘the thing spoken,’ ‘story,’ and ‘arrangement of plot.’44 Over time, the term
came to be associated with any fictitious narrative having supernatural overtones, particularly the
religious stories surrounding the Greek gods.45 Current usage of the English term “myth” goes
beyond the religious dimension and applies to any widely-held notion to which people cling with
religious fervor.46 In this latter sense, we might speak of the ‘myth’ that social security is an
actual fund where our money is held until we retire, or the ‘myth’ of the liberal media.
“Myth” also functions as a derogatory word. This goes back to the Socratic dialogues in
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embodying a popular idea concerning some natural or social phenomenon or some religious belief or
ritual; specifically involving supernatural persons, actions, or events . . . 2. A widely-held story (esp.
untrue or discredited popular) story or belief; an exaggerated or idealized conception of a person,
institution, etc.; a person, institution, etc., widely idealized or misrepresented.; see also “Myth,” NEW
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1164 (2000)(“A traditional, typically ancient story dealing with
supernatural beings, ancestors, or heroes that serves as a fundamental type in the worldview of a people . .
. A fiction or half-truth, especially one that forms part of an ideology.”).
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which mythos is denigrated as an illogical way of explaining events in the world when compared
to logos, a Greek term that refers to systematic explanations based on reasoning and logic.47 It is
a central tenet of the West that culture is moving (that is, evolving) from mythos to logos,48 at
least since the Enlightenment.49
There is strong disagreement on whether one may characterize myths as ‘true’ or ‘false.’
For example, the creation myth of the Bible is factually false – the earth was not created in seven
days – but the truth-value of this Biblical claim is not up for consideration by those who espouse
it; they will say that the language is metaphoric, for example. This is what philosopher Alasdair
MacIntryre had in mind when he said that, “You cannot refute a myth because as soon as you
treat it as refutable, you do not treat it as a myth but as a hypothesis or history.”50 Along these
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48

STAMBOVSKY, supra note 44, at 40 (“By Plato’s time, the polar opposition of mythos and

logos was fully realized.”)
49

MAX HORKHEIMER AND THEODOR ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 3 (John

Cummings trans., 1991)(“The program of the Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world; the
dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy.”); IMMANUEL KANT, On the Question:
What is Enlightenment?, in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 41 (Ted Humphrey trans.,
1983)(defines enlightenment as man’s emergence from superstition and immature belief systems).
50

See Alasdair MacIntyre, Myth, 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 434, 435 (Paul

17

lines, myths are often described as ‘ways of seeing,’ ways of being-in-the- world,51 or in the
words of anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, myth “is not an intellectual explanation . . . but a
pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom.”52 Under this view myth is not true/false
but only living/dead; as a charter for other beliefs, it is a criterion for judging other statements
but its own truth value is not up for consideration.

It functions as what Kelsen called a

grundnorm: a foundational rule that serves as a criterion for subsidiary rules but which is itself
ungrounded in a higher rule.53 And yet we must also recognize that people are not fated to be
dupes to their mythological systems, and that they can switch frameworks and occasionally stand
outside their myths, even renounce them, as happens in political and scientific revolutions.
Indeed, critical theory is premised on this very possibility.
There is also wide disagreement on whether it is possible to get beyond myth, to ground a
system (such as law, or ethics, or politics) on pure logos. This seems to be the driving idea

Edwards ed., 1967). In other words, a mere false belief doesn’t rise to the level of myth unless there is
also some kind of justificatory or legitimating function tied up with the belief.
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myth is a narrative which discloses a sacred world.”).
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HANS KELSEN, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 116-117 (Anders Wedberg

trans., 1946)(“It [the basic norm] is valid because it is presupposed to be valid. And it is presupposed to
be valid because without this presupposition, no human act could be considered as legal, especially a
norm-creating act.”).
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behind much of modern jurisprudence.54

Indeed, the Legal Realist movement of the early

Twentieth Century was an attempt to remove the last vestiges of ‘transcendental nonsense’ and
place the law on a firm footing of social science. Nowadays, most lawyers and even law
professors simply assume that the legal system has been completely denuded of mythology or
that the few remaining traces are being eliminated.55 Perhaps this explains why so little has been
written about the connection between law and mythology, although one might argue more
cynically that legal scholars are simply ashamed to acknowledge the mythological elements
beneath the seeming rigor of legal ‘science.’
Critical theory begins by rejecting the conceit that mythology has been erased from
Western culture, by recognizing that we, too, have our myths.56 As applied to the realm of law,
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See THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 58 (1962)(“We may define

jurisprudence as the shining but unfulfilled dream of a world governed by reason.”).
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See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 400 (1986)(accepting the common law

trope that law is ‘working itself pure’ over time).
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Few people will openly admit that their own fields of study are imbued with myths;

instead, myth is often relegated to a distant culture or, alternatively, to one’s opponents. See, e.g., Mickey
Z., My Back Pages, ABUSE YOUR ILLUSIONS: THE DISINFORMATION GUIDE TO MEDIA MIRAGES AND
ESTABLISHMENT LIES (Russ Kick ed., 2003)(“Mythology, for most Americans, evokes images of Zeus,
Hercules, and Thor; it is something that primitive ancients engaged in before modernity reared its
enlightened head. But America is a nation built upon a foundation of myth, and many forms of
mythology have taken hold: free markets, Western supremacy, the cult of science and technology, and
fundamentalist demagoguery, to name a few.”).
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the leading thinker in this area is without doubt Peter Fitzpatrick, author of The Mythology of
Modern Law, who makes a strong case that myths undergird our legal systems despite rhetoric to
the contrary.57 Fitzpatrick says that the English and American legal systems are riddled with
mythologies about such things as the founding of the social order in a social contract, the
existence of a unified nation (‘we the people’), assumptions about the contours of basic human
autonomy, mens rea, and the ‘reasonable man.’ Our founding documents refer to laws of nature,
and our courtrooms are riddled with religious iconography, oaths to God, judges in black robes,
wigs, and so forth.
For Fitzpatrick, the dominant myth of modern law is precisely the pretense that we lack
myths, a pretense that earns wide acceptance because the more outrageous elements of legal
mythology have been stripped over time, leaving a series of secularized myths.58 This notion
comes from the work of French philosopher and deconstructionist Jacques Derrida, who argues
that mythology survives in modern times as ‘white mythology’ – the mythology of Western
(white) superiority based on the notion that we no longer possess the outrageous myths held by
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PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW ix (1992)(“The very idea of

myth typifies ‘them’ – the savages and ancestors we have left behind.”).
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Id. at ix (“[M]yth is vibrantly operative in modernity. It is not confined to the fitful traces

of antiquity nor is it a matter of mythopoetic aspiration. The obvious conundrum, then, is how this
presence of myth can be reconciled with its denial in modernity. The answer is that the denial is the
myth.”). Compare HORKHEIMER AND ADORNO, supra note 49, at 28 (“In the enlightened world,
mythology has entered into the profane.”).
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primitive cultures.59 As Derrida explained in a seminal essay called White Mythology: “[T]he
white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own logos, that is the
mythos of his idiom, for the universal form of that he must still wish to call Reason . . . White
mythology – metaphysics has erased within itself the fabulous scene that has produced it.”60 In
other words, the overt mythology has been largely erased from the legal system, and what
remains is rather watered-down and secularized but still mythic. In a similar vein, Albert Camus
once quipped that in replacing the King with the social contract we merely exchanged a visible
God for an abstract one.61
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Derrida, of course, is well-known for his emphasis on the symbolic construction of

structures and how they ‘play’ off each other in relations of force and signification; these constructions
can then be deconstructed through a close reading of foundational texts. See JACQUES DERRIDA,
Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 280
(Alan Bass trans. , 1978). Derrida claims that Western culture is built on a series of ostensible binary
concepts and elaborate boundaries (subject/object, speech/writing, public/private, law/violence) that fall
apart on a close reading because one term is artificially privileged over the other. See, e.g., JACQUES
DERRIDA, POSITIONS 71 (Alan Bass trans., 1981)(“[W]e are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence [of
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the name of the social contract . . . The new God is born.”).
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Beyond arguing that myths remain within the law, Fitzpatrick argues that law itself takes
on a mythical status as a kind of divine and transcendental resource containing all answers, a
mega-force standing above and within society:
The mythic composition of law can be made out in its
contradictory attributes.

Law is autonomous yet socially

contingent. It is identified with stability and order yet it changes
and is historically responsive. Law is a sovereign imperative yet
the expression of a popular spirit. Its quasi-religious transcendence
stands in opposition to its mundane temporality. It incorporates the
ideal yet it is a mode of present existence.62
We are not accustomed to speaking in this way about the mythological elements in the law, but
once we start thinking along these lines, it becomes relatively easy to spot colorful instances of
full-blown mythology in the law. For example, here are two passages from first-year casebooks
on the law of contracts, as the authors try to explain why contract law is necessary:
Consider, for example, a society consisting exclusively of full time
hunters and full time potato farmers. No one will have a balanced
diet without exchange of potatoes for meat . . . Consider the
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scientist is compelled by the climate of opinion in which he finds himself to prove that an essentially
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following in our meat and potatoes society. A hunter, H, returns
laden with 50 pounds of meat to his potato-less hut. Meanwhile,
H’s potato farming neighbor, F, has 90 pounds of potatoes in his
hut. H and F may be willing to exchange 30 pounds of potatoes
for 16 pounds of meat.63

[P]eople enter into exchange relationships with one another-trading this for that--for the sole and sufficient reason that it makes
them feel better off to do so. Thus, imagine a world of only two
commodities--apples and oranges--and only two consumers--A and
B--each with different preferences but each wanting to consume
some quantity of both commodities. We can be quite sure that,
unless already satisfied with the allocation of those commodities,
A and B will at once commence to negotiate a trade, with A giving
up some of his apples, say, in exchange for some of B’s oranges
and B doing the opposite. The trading process is not a poker game
in which one player wins and another loses; rather it is a kind of
joint undertaking which increases the wealth of both parties and
from which both emerge with a measure of enhanced utility.64
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These are both narratives of a mythical origin for contract law -- a tale of autonomous and
rational parties who come to market already laden with resources.65 Surely the authors do not
posit this as a historical reality -- it is more akin to a thought experiment -- but their depiction is
telling. By starting from a pre-legal homeostasis of commodity exchange among cavemen, as it
were, every legal restraint on contract comes to appear as a deflowering of the sanctity of the
original condition, which suggests that the best approach is to allow a free market; in this way,
the myth has legal and political consequences.
Corporate law operates in much the same way: it is a series of myths that have important
social and political consequences. I have already alluded to some of the key myths of corporate
law (e.g., that the corporation is a democracy, that it is transparent, etc.), but the mythical status
of corporate law can be seen most clearly in its centerpiece, namely the corporation itself – an
invisible and ephemeral being that is brought to life with texts, much like a medieval Golem.66
Around this mythical being there arises a narrative (namely corporate law) which charts its birth,
65

Marx long ago ridiculed such Robinson Crusoe justifications: “Do not let us go back to

some fictitious primordial condition as the political economist does, when he tries to explain. Such a
primordial condition explains nothing. He merely pushes the question away into a grey nebulous
distance.” See Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 71 (Robert Tucker ed., 1978).
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through Kabbalistic incantations and magic. In some versions of the legend, he is created to protect the
Jews but ends up spinning out of control and must be destroyed. See, e.g., ALAN UNTERMAN,
DICTIONARY OF JEWISH LORE AND LEGEND 86 (1991).
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maintenance, and passage through organic changes.
Starting from the basic notion that corporate law has parallels with mythology, we now
seek a framework for analyzing this mythology. Within critical theory, the dominant framework
for understanding mythology begins with the work of Marx and Nietzsche, and then passes to the
two foremost theorists of myth in the last half century, Claude Levi-Strauss and Roland Barthes:
the former stressed the mediating function of myth, while the latter focused on its legitimating
function.67

Critical Theory of Mythology
For Marx, the law was similar to other cultural institutions in that it arose in a mediation
of the underlying contradictions of the capitalist system, particularly the conflict between classes
(bourgeois versus proletarian).68 To explain how class conflict played out within the legal
system, Marx devoted an entire chapter of Capital to the legal battles over the length of the
working day, which he described as “protracted civil war, more or less dissembled, between the
capitalists and the working class.”69 In other words, this was a physical and material struggle
67
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over working hours and conditions, a struggle that might otherwise have been fought in the
streets and factories, that was instead sublimated to a more abstract level and played out in the
court system. The underlying contradiction simmering beneath the surface (the poor want limits
on the working day while capitalists do not) are then glossed over with the enactment of a single
legislative decree that is wrapped in the mantle of universality and reason, cloaked with abstract
rationalizations about freedom, autonomy, democracy, and equality. The resulting legislation
does not, on the surface, bear the marks of a class struggle; to the contrary, it appears as the
product of deliberation by a representative assembly in the finest tradition of democracy. In
other words, the surface of legal doctrine gives no indication of its class bias. Perhaps the best
illustration of this is Anatole France’s quip, “The majestic equality of the law forbids the rich as
well as the poor from sleeping under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread”70 – his
point being that such laws are meant to apply only to the poor (since the rich have no need to
sleep under bridges) but they are couched in universal terms as applying to all people rich and
poor, since a law that too clearly betrays its class bias would offend the sensibilities of the ruling
class.71 Therefore, the law is the product of mediation between classes, but this mediation is
70
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skewed by the imbalance of power between the classes and then camouflaged by the surface
universalism of the law which seems to apply equally to all persons of all classes.
The Communist Manifesto denounces legal doctrine as a thinly-veiled bourgeois
construction wrapped in universal language: “your jurisprudence is but the will of a class made
into a law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are determined by the economic
conditions of existence of your class.”72 The problem with jurists, according to Marxist theory,
is that instead of realizing that the law contains a class bias, they imagine that they are dealing
with pure concepts devoid of history and struggle – they refuse to see the mediated quality of the
law.73 Engels later illustrated this point with the law of inheritance – it has a particular economic
function in capitalist societies (e.g., concentrating capital and power in the hands of a few men in
a few families) but is justified by jurists as a universal human right derived from man’s
primordial relation to property; thus a contingent social arrangement is grounded in human
nature, and an economic function is elevated to the level of a legal right.74 The goal of the

that a code of law is the blunt, unmitigated, unadulterated expression of the domination of a class – this
would offend the ‘conception of right.’”)
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critical theorist is to cut beneath the halo of universality and point out that law does not derive
from ideas but from the material contradictions and power struggles already operative within the
culture.75
Precisely because the law is buffeted by the rhetoric of reason and universality, it
functions as an intellectual rationalization for the ruling class. In The German Ideology, Marx
applied this analysis to the law of contracts. Given that most contracts are one-sided, he found it
odd that contract law is grounded in the idealized (mythical) figure of the sovereign individual
who freely enters into contracts without coercion. Why should contract law be based on the
notion of free exchange when most individuals have no power to set the terms of their
employment or to freely negotiate most agreements that they sign, which are generally
standardized forms? Marx lambasted contract law for its “illusion that law is based on the will,”
that is the notion that the unequal distribution of property is the result of consensual
agreements.76 The puzzling idea that modern society (replete with inequalities and imbalances of

principles is necessarily also a topsy-turvy one: it goes on without the person who is acting being
conscious of it; the jurist imagines that he is operating with a priori propositions, whereas they are really
only economic reflexes; so everything is upside-down.”)
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power) is the outcome of consent instead of force offers powerful consolation to those who have
power and are charged with administering the law, because it means that they took their positions
by merit instead of domination.
Marx saw the dominant legal concepts of his day as a kind of “modern mythology”77
which is invoked to justify the existing arrangement. Marx’s comments on religion would seem
to apply with equal force to law: “Religion is the generalized theory of this world, its
encyclopedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritualistic point of honor, its
enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, its general ground of consolation and
justification.”78 The task for the critical thinker is to look below the surface of religion (and
below the surface of law) to expose the underlying contradictions that drive the surface
doctrines, and then to ask how the doctrines lend an unwarranted legitimacy to existing
arrangements.
These themes of mediation and legitimation appear a few decades later in Nietzsche’s
The Birth of Tragedy, where Nietzsche reads the great Attic tragedies as mediation between
Dionysian and Apollonian forces operative in the Greek world at the time.79 The Dionysian

divorced from its real basis – on free will. . . . In civil law the existing property relations are declared to
be the result of the general will.”).
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force, named for the god of wine, was characterized by boundless energy, drunkenness, chaos,
music, and creative destruction. At the other extreme was an Apollonian force is characterized
by measure, order, form, architectonic, and sculpture. These two opposing traditions squared off
within Greek culture, creating a tension that is visible in Greek tragedy, where the Dionysian
force is represented by the chorus while the Apollonian is represented by the structure of the
narrative and the dialogue. For example, in the Oedipal drama, the hero discovers the ultimate
Apollonian rule of order (the incest taboo) only after he impulsively transgresses this rule in
Dionysian fashion (by sleeping with his mother). In other words, to understand Greek tragedy,
one must understand how it serves to mediate the underlying tensions within the culture.
Eschewing the Enlightenment position that seeks to move beyond mythology, Nietzsche
insisted that some degree of mythology was essential as a counterweight to science. Nietzsche
goes so far as to chastise Socrates as the prototypical man of science (the precursor to modern
man) who spends his life elevating the power of reason. The problem with this, Nietzsche says,
is that science needs art (and hence mythology) to give it purpose and direction. Commenting on
Socrates’ decision to learn music prior to his death, Nietzsche imagines Socrates finally
recognizing the value of art, wondering “Perhaps there is a realm of wisdom from which the
logician is exiled? Perhaps art is even a necessary correlative of, and supplement for science.”80
Based on these passages we can say that Nietzsche saw a role for mythos as a counterweight to
logos, and in his later works, Nietzsche called for the creative fashioning of new myths, so long
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as they are life-affirming, something that he found lacking in Christian mythology.81 Nietzsche,
then, refused to herald a post-mythical period where science would replace myth: rather, the
‘Death of God’ creates an opportunity for new myths, something that Nietzsche attempted in
Thus Spake Zarathustra.
Beyond the mediating function of Attic tragedy, the Greek myths served to legitimate the
hardships of Greek life:
The Greek knew and felt the terror and horror of existence. That
he might endure this terror at all, he had to interpose between
himself and life the radiant dream-birth of the Olympians . . . It
was out of the direct necessity to live that the Greeks created these
gods . . . How else could these people, so sensitive, so vehement
in its desires, so singularly constituted for suffering, how could
they have endured existence, if it had not been revealed to them in
their gods, surrounded by a higher glory.82
People can see themselves in the stories of the Gods, with the Olympians servings as a kind of
“transfiguring mirror” in which we can gaze to learn about ourselves.83 Putting these elements
81
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together, we can say that the Nietzschean view is that myth is a play of opposing forces, couched
in a narrative that legitimates a particular way of life.
From Marx and Nietzsche we get the notion that a given text (say, corporate law) must be
analyzed in terms of the underlying tensions that it expresses. In addition, we must ask what
type of social and political arrangement is legitimated by the text. These nascent themes of
mediation and legitimation found expression in Twentieth Century in the work of French
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss and French semiotician Roland Barthes.
Levi-Strauss explicitly identifies himself as a structuralist in the tradition of Freud, Marx,
and Saussure, and like these figures he insists that seemingly unitary phenomena such as the self,
society, and language can only be understood as a struggle between opposing components held
in dynamic tension.84

Levi-Strauss insisted that the purpose of myth is to mediate between

opposites that do not admit of a strict reconciliation, or as he says, “the purpose of myth is to
provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction (an impossible achievement if, as
it happens, the contradiction is real).”85 The contradictions worked out in myths cannot be
overcome in real life because they are intractable given the social and epistemological
framework in which they arise – thus they are overcome only in symbolic form, much in the

Eliot trans., 1989)(“In the object which he contemplates, therefore, man becomes acquainted with himself
. . . We know the man by the object, by his conception of what is external to himself; in it his nature
becomes evident; this object is his manifested nature, his true objective ego.”).
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same way that a dream will use symbols to express and overcome a real-life conflict. LeviStrauss used this framework to analyze the Oedipus myth and Native American myths, breaking
them down into complicated series of oppositions: life-death, raw-cooked, foreign-native,
village-town, human-divine, and so forth. In other words, myth is dialectical – two oppositions
are mediated with a third term, forming a triad that symbolically resolves the conflict and thereby
eases the tension of the conflict without, it must be noted, actually solving the contradiction in
real life. This last point is worth emphasizing: the oppositions mediated by myth are not
solvable: Levi-Strauss says cryptically that they are akin to Hamlet’s dilemma ‘to be or not to be’
– and so we go on forever spinning myths to mediate cultural oppositions. The only difference
between the ‘savage’ and the civilized man is the materials that he uses to spin the myths; the
mental operation is identical. The job of the anthropologist is to read the surface text of the
myth, break it down into structured oppositions (a “basic antinomy”86) and then show how the
myth resolves the antinomy at a symbolic level. Thus in a tortuous reading he claims that the
Oedipus myth is a symbolic attempt to reconcile the belief that one is born from the earth with
the knowledge that one is born of human beings, a conclusion that he reaches after breaking the
myth into structural oppositions, e.g., between overrating blood relations in the guise of having
sex with one’s mother versus underrating blood relations by killing one’s father, the killing of
monsters versus the killing of humans, walking upright versus walking with difficulty, and so on.
All of this mediation takes place within people at the unconscious level: just as I know the rules
of grammar unconsciously but cannot state them explicitly, so I am familiar with the reigning
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myths of my culture but I cannot comprehend them schematically.

The task of the

anthropologist is to identify the underlying structures beneath the surface of the myths. The
novelty and power of Levi-Strauss’ approach was due to his scrupulous attention to detail, as
evidenced in volume upon volume of myth analysis. Like the other structuralists, he was
searching for universal structures common to all people beneath the diversity of culture.
French semiotician Roland Barthes took a different approach. Instead of seeing myths as
expressions of deep-seated contradictions of the human condition across cultures, Barthes
insisted that myths are symbolic expressions of localized power struggles. Their purpose is not
to mediate deep conflicts of human nature, but rather to naturalize a dominant way of life as
inevitable, or in his words, “I resented seeing Nature and History confused at every turn, and I
wanted to track down, in the decorative display of what-goes-without-saying, the ideological
abuse which, in my view, is hidden there.”87 Barthes’ primary target was contemporary French
popular culture -- toys, cars, museum exhibits, wrestling matches, wine, milk, soap commercials,
etc. Thus one could ‘read’ a soap commercial, a museum display, a tube of suntan lotion, or a
magazine cover in the same way that one could read a novel. Beneath the obvious falsity of
advertising and popular culture, there were subtle messages that justified and perpetuated the
current economic and political arrangement. To be sure, this is a much expanded notion of
‘myth,’and this is precisely Barthes’ point – that we are surrounded by myths that are pernicious
precisely because they do not appear to us as myths. Modern man does not sit around the
campfire telling mythical narratives about spirits, but he certainly goes shopping and buys
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different toys for boys than for girls, and in so doing (in buying guns and cars for boys) he
perpetuates a myth about gender roles.
Barthes argues that myth freezes history. It presents the current world as the only
possible world, papering over the historical struggles that simmer beneath the surface. It also
consecrates the existing order as common sense, thereby disabling alternatives. Barthes’ classic
example of this is a cover of Paris Match depicting a black soldier saluting the French flag,
which he saw as a myth about minorities consenting to French colonialism.

The actual

contradictions of colonialism – France versus the colonies, white versus black, first world versus
third world, Christian versus pagan – all of these conflicts are magically defused by the mass
media in the depiction of an obedient colonial subject.
Barthes sees myth as largely (but not wholly) allied with the bourgeois worldview, to the
point where myth is a type of ‘depoliticized speech’ that flattens out and harmonizes conflicts:
“[I]t does away with all dialectics . . . it organizes a world without contradictions.”88 This
benefits the class who owns the productive apparatus for the mass transmission of symbols
(television, newspapers, magazines, movies), as well as those who have a stake in the current
arrangement. The job of the critic, says Barthes, is to deconstruct myths and expose them as a
naked attempt to naturalize a contingent arrangement, thereby returning language to responsible
usage, returning meaning to words and images that have been hijacked, as it were.89 Barthes

88

Id. at 143.

89

Id. at 156 (noting that the unveiling of myths is “founded on a responsible idea of

language”).

35

tended to draw his examples from French popular culture, but his basic point can be found in
American folk tales, for example in the Horatio Alger myth that anyone in America can make it
with hard work.90
Barthes also makes the deeper point that myth becomes an official language among those
with power. In one of his few essays relating to law he offered some comments on the trial of a
rural landowner who killed two campers, noting the stark difference between the language used
by the legal officials and that of the defendant: “Naturally, everyone pretends to believe that it is
the official language which is common sense, that of [the defendant] being only one of its
ethnological varieties, picturesque in its poverty.”91 Barthes says that the judge and prosecutor
are ‘at home’ in the language of law but this language appears as an alien discourse to outsiders.
As he puts it, the law “depicts you as you should be, and not as you are.”92 In this sense, the law
foists an alien narrative and an alien language upon those who stand outside the circle of officials
and those with power.
Myth often neturalizes contradictions through the creation of an ‘empty signifier,’ a kind
of symbolic black hole that swallows up contested narratives like a dead letter office. Barthes
90
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cites the Eiffel Tower as an example of an empty sign that no longer serves any material
purpose: “This pure – virtually empty sign – is ineluctable, because it means everything: the
symbol of Paris, of modernity, of communication, of science in the Nineteenth Century, rocket,
stem, derrick, phallus, lightning rod or insect, confronting the great itineraries of our dreams, it is
the inevitable sign.”93 This phenomenon occurs frequently with respect to words and concepts
like ‘patriotism’ and ‘freedom,’ or symbols such as the flag. In the empty sign we can unpack
the contradictory forces at work in the culture.
Because I will argue that the modern corporation is an empty signifier, I want to spend a
little time focusing on how this concept plays out in contemporary critical theory. The leading
figure in this area is the obscure and enigmatic critic Slajov Zizek, who is heavily influenced by
the work of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, especially Lacan’s notion that selfhood is
characterized by a profound absence, a lack around which a self is constructed through language
and symbols. In a similar fashion, Zizek argues that all systems of meaning are structured
around a negative void of signification that serves as a placeholder. In other words, the empty
signifier is a key structural foundation for discourse – it is a signifier (a concept) that lacks a
clear signfied but which ties together other signifieds, much in the same way that zero is not a
number itself but functions as a placeholder for other numbers.94 Zizek speaks of the empty
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signifier as a “master signifier” that does not refer to anything but simply functions as a “nodal
point” that “quilts” other signifiers.95 As he explains, “In order for the series of signifiers to
signify something (to have a determinate meaning), there must be a signifier (a ‘something’) that
stands for ‘nothing,’ a signifying element whose very presence stands for the absence of
meaning.”96 Since the entire symbolic edifice is built around an empty center, it can shift
precipitously during power struggles. To use examples from our culture, consider how the term
“feminist” went from a badge of honor to a pejorative, or how the term “liberal” has shifted from
its original meaning into the dreaded ‘L word.’ In other words, power struggles are fought not
only in the streets but as contests over the control of symbols and meaning, on a stage where
meaning is fluid.
Zizek’s example of the empty signifier is the figure of the Jew in Nazi Germany, who
(Zizek claims) is detested not for any particular qualities he possesses, but rather as a kind of
repository of German negativity. The Jew is an empty category onto which Germany projected
its ridiculous obsession with racial categories, its fetish for order, its insane scapegoating, its
herd mentality. Zizek claims that the Jew is an empty signifier for Germans since it subsumes
opposites: the Jew is simultaneously declaimed as dirty (‘dirty Jew’) and fastidious (‘See how
well they hide their dirt!’), elitist yet vulgar, educated but ignorant, disloyal yet insistent on
citizenship, and so forth. The Jew “is the point at which social negativity as such assumes
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positive existence.”97
A similar point was made with less jargon by cultural theorist Frederic Jameson in his
analysis of the figure of the shark in the movie Jaws. 98 The dreaded shark actually plays a very
small role in the movie, only appearing toward the end.

For the bulk of the picture, the

background presence of the shark serves to simply highlight tensions running beneath the surface
on the resort island: the greed of the mayor versus the sheriff’s concern for public safety, the
ostentatious tourists who litter the beaches versus the marine biologist’s demand that we respect
nature, the repressive surface of village life versus the rebellious forces of youth, and so forth.
The shark matters very little in this economy of tensions – its part could just as well have been
played by a hurricane or killer octopus; the ‘shark’ is not significant for its positive attributes but
rather for the constellation of tensions that it illuminates. In a similar vein, I will argue below
that the modern corporation is not significant for its positive qualities (it has very few) but rather
for the underlying tensions within our culture that it reveals.
Mediation, legitimation, and empty signifiers – these, then, are our leading concepts for
the mythological analysis of corporate law. By seeing corporate law as a system of meaning,
that is, by reading it as a text, we can locate the underlying tensions that drive it. As we have
seen, myths arise as a way of mediating contradictions. The same holds true for the corporation,
a mythical entity (a secular God) that arises to mediate and defuse the tensions between
capitalism and justice.
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The Mediating Function of Corporate Law
Historically speaking, the American corporation has a split personality because it is
simultaneously an economic set of relationships and a social institution.99 As a economic
arrangement it is a vehicle for investment and concentration of capital under a centralized
management. As a social actor, its decisions affect millions of people in terms of employment,
pensions, products, and political and cultural influence.

Historically speaking, the earliest

corporations were social actors such as universities or municipalities, or they were public service
entities that brought together large concentrations of capital for big projects like building a
bridge or tunnel. Only in the last century was it possible for private parties to form a corporation
for profit without a specific legislative edict. Over time, then, the corporation has become less
tied to its social role and more tied to its economic dimension.
This Janus-faced status of the corporation (economic and social) reflects a deep
contradiction at the heart of American culture – this is the contradiction between profit and
fundamental justice. On the one hand, our entire way of life is grounded in a capitalist system
driven by corporations and the restless pursuit of profit – let us call this the commitment to
profit. On the other hand, we are deeply committed to democracy, fairness, equality, welfare,
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and due process in all areas of our lives – let us call this the commitment to justice. There is a
real flesh-and-blood conflict between the corporation as an economic tool versus the corporation
as a social actor. Indeed, this is at the heart of all burning questions about the conduct of
corporations nowadays.
To see how our commitments to profit conflicts with our commitment to justice, and how
both are reflective of the dual nature of the corporation as an economic relation and as a social
actor, consider what noted business writer Michael Lewis recently had to say about the scandals
rocking Wall Street:
$17 trillion or so is invested [in the stock market] with the implicit
instruction: “Just give me back as much money as possible. Gouge
consumers, cheat employees, poison the environment, lie to the
public markets – just do it all sufficiently artfully that it doesn’t
dent my portfolio.” Then, when the market falls and one of the
people on the receiving end of their beastly demands is caught
behaving badly, investors collapse to the floor in disbelief and beg
for their money back. It is at that moment – and not a minute
before – that they discover the novel idea that businessmen in
possession of other people’s capital should be held to the highest
ethical standards . . . This sort of hypocrisy is woven deeply into
the fabric of American business life.100
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This ‘hypocrisy’ is on display in the contradictory emotions that most Americans feel towards
Wal-Mart, America’s biggest company, which is both loved and hated, often by a single
person.101 A profile of the company in Fortune captured this shifting range of emotion:
Where you stand on Wal-Mart, then, seems to depend on where
you sit. If you are a consumer, Wal-Mart is good for you. If
you’re a wage earner, there’s a good chance it’s bad. If you’re a
Wal-Mart shareholder, you want the company to grow. If you’re a
citizen, you probably don’t want it growing in your backyard. So,
which one are you? And that’s the point: Chances are, you’re
more than one . . . It’s important that this debate continue. But in
holding the mirror up to Wal-Mart, we would do well to turn it
101
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back on ourselves. Sam Walton created Wal-Mart. But we created
it, too.102

This suggests that we demand contradictory things from the corporate entity: low-priced
consumer goods based on low labor costs but fair treatment of workers; increasing stock price
but good behavior toward the environment and the community; stalwart leadership by captains of
industry but corporate democracy. Considering the extent of our involvement with corporations
(not just as investors or employees, but as consumers) it becomes clear that these contradictions
go to the heart of our lifestyle. If we cannot resolve this tension within ourselves, it should come
as no surprise that corporate law merely restates the tension without resolving it. In what
follows, I want to mention a few ways that the tension between profits and justice gets played out
in corporate law. Again, all of these tension are based on the fundamental division in the
corporation as both an economic unit and a social actor.
First, corporate law never comes down one way or the other on whether the modern
corporation is a public entity (hence a social actor) or a purely private entity (and hence an
economic relationship).103 A little over a century ago, corporations were irreducibly public –
they could arise only by special charter from the legislature after demonstrating some public
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purpose.104 Yet with the rise of general incorporation statutes in the late Nineteenth Century, any
private person could organize a corporation without a specific legislative grant simply by filing
paperwork with the secretary of state, and without demonstrating a public purpose other than
private gain. Today, the modern corporation requires a pro forma ‘charter’ from the state and
must pay an annual franchise fee, something that a purely private organization such as a
partnership does not, and in this sense it is still a public creature, but there is no need to
demonstrate social utility in order to receive the charter. So the corporation is not really public
nor private – it exists in a kind of netherworld between the two, which is why theorists disagree
on whether the corporation has duties to the general public.105
As Chancellor Allen pointed out, the law does not resolve this tension but simply papers
over it by allowing corporations the maximum leeway to favor either their economic function
(justified as a short-term interest) or the social function (rationalized as a long-term interest):
Two inconsistent conceptions have dominated our thinking about
corporations since the evolution of the large integrated business
corporation in the late nineteenth century. Each conception could
104
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claim dominance for a particular period, or among one group or
another, but neither has so commanded agreement as to exclude
the other from the discourses of law or the thinking of business
people.

In the first conception, the corporation is seen as the

private property of its stockholders-owners . . . The second
conception sees the corporation not as the private property of
stockholders but as a social institution [tinged] with a public
purpose . . . The law ‘papered over’ the conflict in our conception
of the corporation by invoking a murky distinction between longterm profit maximization and short-term profit maximization.106
In other words, the law punts on this issue by permitting a corporation to do anything: it can
benefit the community (the public) by invoking the need for long-term benefits or it can
ruthlessly pinch pennies by invoking the need for short-term benefit. The Model Business
Corporation Act simply refuses to decide on whether a corporation should maximize profits in
the short term, as the official comment makes clear: “In determining the corporation’s best
interests, the director has wide discretion in deciding how to weigh near-term opportunities
versus long-term benefits as well as making judgements where the interests of various groups
within the shareholder body or having other cognizable interests in the enterprise may vary.”107
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The American Law Institute stepped into this debate but came up equally powerless to provide a
clear way of deciding how the economic function of the corporation should balance the social
function:
2.01 The Object and Conduct of the Corporation
(a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) . . . a corporation
should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with
a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.
(b) Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby
enhanced, the corporation in the conduct of its business:
(1) Is obliged, to the same extent as a natural
person, to act within the boundaries of law;
(2) May take into account ethical
considerations that are reasonably regarded as
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business;
and
(3) May devote a reasonable amount of
resources to public welfare, humanitarian,
educational, and philanthropic purposes.108
Notice the flip-flops here: the corporation should seek profit and shareholder gain, but may take
actions that do not enhance profit and shareholder gain: in other words, the should is not
mandatory. And notice the prodigious use of the term ‘reasonable,’ a sure tip-off that the
drafters are simply invoking the status quo. In other words, this rule merely restates in legalese
the tensions that already exist between profit and justice, between the economic and social
function of the corporation. By using legalese, it creates the impression that the conflict is
resolved, when in fact the conflict is merely restated in legal form.
This dual nature of the corporation gets played out in so-called ‘constituency’ or
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‘stakeholder’ statutes which arose in the 1980s amid hostile takeovers, restructurings and plant
closings in the Midwest, particularly in Pennsylvania and Illinois.

The idea was to allow

directors of a target company to resist a takeover at a premium price by appealing to the
destructive effect it would have on employees, suppliers, and the community. The classic
constituency statute enacted in Pennsylvania allows (but does not require) a board of directors to
use their business judgment to consider the effects of a transaction on such stakeholders and not
merely on shareholders.109 This, then, was an attempt to mediate profit and justice, but the law
refused to come down on either side. These statutes are generally permissive – they allow, but
do not mandate, a board of directors to consider the effects of a decision on stakeholders.110
Rather than force the recognition of the conflict and impose an ordering of priorities, the statutes
merely create the impression that all interests of all parties can be harmonized through the proper
exercise of business judgment. This symbolic resolution of a real conflict is a sure tip-off that we
are dealing with myth – in this case, the myth of the American corporation as both a socially
responsible actor and a profit machine.
Another puzzle concerns whether a corporation is a democracy. In its capacity as a
voluntary association, it would seen to require democratic structure. On the other hand, if a
109
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corporation is simply a private vehicle for passive investment there is no basis for democracy,
just as buying a certificate of deposit from a bank does not entitle one to vote on how the bank
should be governed. The great size of many corporations and their vast power over our lives
often exceeds that of the government (in fact, we are more likely to look to a corporation instead
of the state when it comes to health care and retirement), which leads us to think that corporate
power must be balanced with a flourishing democratic counterweight, at least in the form of
effective voting by shareholders, if not by workers and other constituencies.
This raises an important question as to the meaning of the American corporation. Is it a
purely economic entity where democracy is out of place, or is it a cultural institution (a minigovernment) that must retain features of participatory democracy? Rather than resolving this
question, corporate law once again papers over the conflict by allowing corporations to appear
as nominal democracies while actually functioning as single-party oligarchies most of the time.
Thus the Delaware courts can speak of ‘corporate democracy’ even though virtually all corporate
elections are uncontested.111
The underlying dilemma is that corporations have tremendous economic and political
power (not to mention their power to shape public opinion) but they are ruled by a handful of
111
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appointed managers. When a giant corporation decides to pull out of a city (for example,
General Motors’ decision to shutter its plants in Flint during the late 1980s, or General Electric’s
decision to pull operations from Schenectady), the decision affects the lives on hundreds of
thousands of residents who have little input into the decision. In such a situation, the company
had more power to influence the lives of local residents than the local government did. One
could even argue that the leaders of the top corporations in America possess a power equal to the
members of the House of Representatives in terms of resources at their disposal for impacting
people’s lives (short of declaring war) when we factor in their ability to influence legislators and
their possession of a private arsenal of lawyers that puts the government’s resources to shame.
This situation has been known for some time. Consider how little has changed in the seventy
years since Berle and Means published their groundbreaking treatment of the modern
corporation:
[T]he stockholder is practically reduced to the alternative of not
voting at all or else of handing over his vote to individuals over
whom he has no control and in whose selection he did not
participate. In neither case will he be able to exercise any measure
of control . . . When ownership is sufficiently subdivided, the
management can thus become a self-perpetuating body even
though its share in the ownership is negligible.

This form of

control can properly be called ‘management control.’112
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Berle was concerned about how this situation would lead to managerialism (dominance by
managers) although he tended to believe that corporations would develop a social conscience
spontaneously.113 For a while it was hoped that the condition of shareholder powerlessness
would be remedied by the rise of institutional shareholders who own large blocks of stock and
were expected to play an active role in controlling the managers. Unfortunately, this hasn’t
exactly worked, since the costs of running a proxy contest are still far beyond the gains that a
shareholder (even a large one) can expect after spending time and money to challenge
management’s candidates, and in any event such exorbitant costs are not recoverable unless the
contest is successful. The end result of all of this is that the modern corporation is essentially a
self-perpetuating oligarchy of managers largely immune from input by shareholders, employees,
and directors. Over the last two decades, any number of new ideas have been trotted out to find
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a way to align the interests of managers with shareholders and employees – stock option plans,
401k plans, employee stock ownership plans, and so forth: and yet today the modern corporation
is not controlled by the persons most affected by it – namely shareholders, employees, and the
community. Just as no one can figure out what a corporation is, no one can figure out whom the
corporation is supposed to serve.
The ‘economic entity versus social actor’ conflict within the modern corporation also gets
played out over the question of whether corporations ought to be transparent to investors and
third parties. The profit motive has always favored secrecy, but justice requires transparency. In
the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 and the dawn of the Great Depression, the
government enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934, which were
supposed to usher in a new regime of regulated public markets based on full disclosure by
corporations. And yet companies struggle to find ingenious ways to hide bad news. In the
recent corporate scandals, most of the companies indicted (Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia,
ImClone, Global Crossing, Sprint, Tyco International) were exchange-traded companies that
purported to disclose all material information to the public. Most of these companies submitted
fraudulent reports for years, undetected by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The current disclosure regime parades as full disclosure but encourages companies to
bury information in plain sight. Business Week magazine recently profiled a professional stock
analyst at a large fund who needed two weeks to decipher a single report from Xerox, raising the
important question, “If a professional stock analyst has that much trouble getting her arms
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around a company’s financials, what hope is there for the average investor?”114 Annual reports
often reach one thousand pages of small print, with dozens of pages of risk factors, whereas
investors nowadays typically hold a stock for only a brief period, and given the time needed to
review all the relevant filings, no one can seriously sift through the disclosures. The bottom line
is that very few investors actually read the filings, and those who do are usually clueless to detect
wrongdoing. Prior to the implosion at Enron, only a handful of nay sayers had the temerity to
complain that Enron’s SEC filings were opaque, and even this was restricted to a few shortsellers (those who sell borrowed shares and then return them later, hoping to profit from a fall in
price); most people simply didn’t read the disclosures and didn’t care.115 The best example of
this comes from the man who headed the Securities and Exchange Commission under President
Clinton – Arthur Levitt. After decades on Wall Street he took the position as head of the SEC,
which required him to immediately sell his stocks or invest solely in mutual funds, to avoid
conflicts of interest that might arise if he was heavily invested in a single company that reported
to the SEC. Levitt confessed his inability to read the mutual fund disclosures:
As I poured over fund prospectuses, what really got under my skin
was that the documents were impossible to understand. At first I
114
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was embarrassed. Then it hit me: if someone with twenty-five
years in the securities business couldn’t decipher the jargon,
imagine the frustration of the average investor.

Mutual fund

prospectuses were written in impenetrable legalese, by and for
securities lawyers.116

The whole idea of public disclosure and transparent markets falls apart when so few investors
read these disclosures and even fewer can understand them. The common rejoinder to this is that
customers can benefit from the work of intermediaries to help decipher the filings (e.g.,
stockbrokers, mutual fund managers) yet the recent corporate scandals made clear that much of
the fraudulent behavior is accomplished with the willing cooperation of stock analysts, brokers,
lawyers, and mutual fund managers, which suggests that these intermediaries are part of the
problem instead of the solution.
The SEC is supposed to catch wrongdoing by publicly-traded companies, but their
presence is mostly symbolic. The SEC’s Corporate Finance division employs some 100 lawyers
to monitor the voluminous filings of 17,000 public corporations, and the entire staff turns over
every three years because staff members often leave for higher-paying private sector positions.117
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One staff accountant recently admitted that the agency can afford to review only one in fifteen
annual reports.118 In any event, the SEC brings less than one hundred insider-trading cases per
year while the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ execute more than a billion trades per
year.119

This leaves the task to shareholders and their attorneys who stand to make money from

exposing corporate fraud; but even here the voice of pessimism makes itself heard due to the
passage in 1995 of the Private Litigation Securities Reform Act, which placed a series of
procedural barriers to recovery in lawsuits for securities fraud. One solution to this problem is to
make disclosures readable by ordinary investors. This was the basic idea behind the SEC’s new
‘Plain English Rules,’ but these apply only to initial registration statements and not periodic
reports.120 In the end, given the impenetrable disclosures, the high stock turnover rates, and the
subtleties by which corporations can hedge their disclosures, the entire disclosure system holds
mostly symbolic value.

The end result is not true transparency but the impression of

transparency, a condition that satisfies neither those who see the corporation as an economic
engine nor those who see it as a social actor with a duty to report the truth to investors.
All of this confusion over the ontology of the corporation – and the contradictory
demands that we place upon it – get played out in the question of corporate taxation. On the one
118
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hand, corporations make money like regular people and so we expect them to pay taxes; on the
other hand, the corporation is reducible to human beings who pay individual taxes, and so there
seems to be something excessive about taxing corporations.121 Calls for an end to ‘double
taxation’ can be heard from the President on down, and yet at the same time, the corporate tax
rules are so lax that a majority of corporations pay little or no taxes – and nowhere near the rate
that individuals pay.122 And the situation is compounded by the ability of corporations to obtain
a charter in the Caribbean to avoid taxation altogether, something that an individual cannot do.123
Here again we see the contradictory ‘X and not-X’ quality of the corporation: it a taxpayer but
can avoid taxation.
I have gone into depth in describing a series of contradictions that go to the heart of our
conception of the modern corporation: it is a democracy – and not; it has duties beyond profitseeking – and not; it is transparent – and not; it is an entity – and not; it is a voluntary nexus of
121
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contracts – and not; it is a person – and not; it is public – and not; it is a taxpayer – and not. All
of this reflects the backbreaking load that we place on the modern corporation. On the one hand,
we demand an economy of advanced industrial mass production spurred by the profit motive,
and to achieve this we permit corporations to grow to massive size, dwarfing even the
government’s own resources. On the other hand, we recoil when this creature refuses to behave
as a social actor with a conscience and cuts benefits, pollutes, runs sweatshops, and flexes
political muscle. It is said that, ‘At 40 you get the face you deserve,’ and the same can be said of
the modern corporation – we get an entity that reflects but does not resolve our deepest
contradictions. Corporate law does not solve these contradictions but merely creates a vague,
catch-all, mystery being (the ‘corporation’) and then instructs directors and officers to pursue the
corporation’s ‘best interests’ without telling them what that means. The analogy with religion
should be obvious.
The existence of contradictions within the heart of the American corporation (and within
our culture) helps to explain the strange phenomenon where people simultaneously admire and
despise large companies such as Wal-Mart, which is a ball of contradictions. Founder Sam
Walton purported to be concerned with workers, whom he magnanimously labeled “associates,”
yet the company is virulently anti-union. As reported in a recent profile in Fortune magazine,
“Wal-Mart is the nation’s largest employer, and not a single one of its 1.3 million workers
(‘associates’ in Wal-Martese) is a union member . . . In February 2000 the meat-cutting
department at one Wal-Mart store voted to establish a union. Two weeks later the company
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disbanded its meat-cutting departments.”124 And yet Wal-Mart was named Fortune’s most
admired company in 2004. Even Robert Reich, the Secretary of Labor under President Clinton,
was puzzled by how we schizophrenically lavish praise on companies that yield high returns yet
treat workers badly: “We have split brains. Most of the time, the half of our brain that wants the
best deal prevails.”125

Even people who hate Wal-Mart find themselves shopping there,

revealing a deep conflict within Americans.
The contradictions listed above were prominently displayed in Enron Corp.126

For

example, it had a corporate code of ethics, yet behaved unethically; it filed annual and quarterly
disclosure documents but no one could decipher them; it had an employee stock plan but ended
up destroying the lives of its employees; it was greedy yet made lavish gifts to the Houston
community; it heralded energy deregulation so that customers could get lower prices, yet it
manipulated the energy supply to practically drive the State of California to bankruptcy; its CFO
won CFO Magazine’s highest honor for financial prowess, yet he and his wife were later
indicted.127 When it was all over, there was nothing for the perpetrators to do except blame the
entire corporate system: “I did it because I was trying to maximize profits for Enron,” said one
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trader.128
Just as we love and hate big corporations, we love to canonize corporate executives as
mythical figures and wunderkinds, and then we express outrage when the same people turn out to
be criminals.129 A few decades ago the greatest adulation was lavished on financiers like Ivan
Boesky and Michael Milken, who used debt financing to spur corporate takeovers, arguing that
the pressure of repayment would spur management to efficiency. Boesky – an arbitrageur with
sketchy background and few outside interests – was worshiped to the point where he was invited
to address the 1986 graduating class at Berkeley business school, where he said, “Greed is all
right, by the way. I think greed is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good about
yourself.”130 Before the speech he pompously told a local newspaper that business students
needed to follow his example to become a new nobility to advance the betterment of mankind. A
few years later, Boesky was headed to jail for massive securities fraud. Similarly, Michael
Milken was hailed as the inventor of junk-bond financing, and was once the most important
player in the takeover game. Universally praised and emulated, he was invited all over the world
to give speeches on such topics as how to solve the Latin America debt crisis. His central idea
was to issue high-yield debt securities to finance takeovers at a time when debt was considered a
conservative investment restricted to low yields. Within a decade of his meteoric rise, Milken
128
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was in jail for insider trading, while the companies that he leveraged to the hilt were in terrible
shape.131

Neither Milken nor Boesky were particularly interesting people, nor did they

accomplish any social purpose beyond financial machinations: when Milken’s defense team
asked the billionaire to list his personal achievements so that he could be positioned as a
sympathetic figure to the American people, he mentioned a dance contest that he won in fifth
grade.132

Looking back on the giants of the 1980s, noted business writer and television

commentator James Cramer lamented that, “All of my heroes turned out to be crooks.”133 A few
years later, one of Cramer’s proteges would write an expose of Cramer himself, alleging that
Cramer used his publicity to manipulate the markets illegally.134 The same cycle of worship and
disgust continues today. CFO Magazine gave its 1998 Excellence award to Scott Sullivan of
WorldCom, its 1999 award to Andrew Fastow of Enron, and its 2000 award to Tyco
International’s Mark Swartz – all three have now been indicted!135 Most of the finance icons of
the 1990s fell away into disgrace: Bill Gates of Microsoft was embroiled in antitrust actions;
Jack Welch of GE was exposed for his wasteful retirement package while laying off employees
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en masse; Al ‘Chainsaw’ Dunlop was barred from serving as an officer of a public company; and
Donald Trump, perhaps the biggest mythical figure of the last twenty years (even having his own
reality show) keeps his finances private, but rode the casino portion of his empire into
bankruptcy reorganization.136 Against all evidence, we want to believe that great fortunes can be
made with honest effort, that a corporation can serve an economic as well as a social purpose,
that it can bring high returns to everyone simultaneously (managers-workers-shareholders), that
it can be transparent and honest, democratic and hyper-efficient.137

But in the real world, this

isn’t true: only in the myth-heavy world of corporate law do we find a super-entity staffed by
wunderkinds that can satisfy these contradictory demands without making tragic choices between
social versus economic benefits. And that is precisely why the myth exists – to reassure us that
the underlying contradictions are not fatal.

The Legitimating Function of Corporate Law
Corporate law legitimates the status quo in two ways. First, it is so permissive that it
sanctifies virtually all corporate conduct (even objectionable conduct) as ‘legal’ and thereby
presumptively immune from criticism. And second, it redescribes socially destructive corporate
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behavior in a gloss of palatable terms and concepts such as ‘business judgment,’ ‘corporate
democracy,’ and ‘efficient markets.’ This upbeat gloss obscures the dark side of having a culture
that is dominated by corporations, including the antisocial tendencies of large corporations and
their role in concentrating capital in a few hands.
The term “legitimacy” was originally used with reference to situations where a man
accepted a child as the product of his marriage instead of leaving the child unclaimed as a
‘bastard.’138 Over time, the term was also used to describe political arrangements where people
subject to power acquiesce in the stated grounds by which power is exercised over them, in other
words, consensual arrangements of power.139 Most political authority is backed by physical
force in the last instance, and perhaps this is why Chairman Mao once said that, “Political power
grows out of the barrel of a gun,”140 but a regime that relies solely on raw power will be
inherently unstable compared to a regime where people feel that the governing system is
legitimate. Sociologist Max Weber long ago pointed out that raw physical coercion is an
unstable method of governance compared to arrangements where the people believe in the
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justness of the system under which they are ruled – thus every relation of domination seeks to
justify itself in the eyes of its subjects, whether by appealing to tradition (‘this is how things have
always been’), appealing to charisma (‘we place our trust in the leader to guide us’), or appealing
to formal-rational procedures (‘our representatives acceded to their positions in conformity with
rules laid out in advance’).141 Weber argued forcefully that the modern era in the West is
characterized by the weakening of religion and tradition, leaving formal-rational enactment as
the dominant method of legitimation in modern society: “Today the most common form of
legitimacy is the belief in legality, i.e., the acquiescence in enactments which are formally
correct and which have been made in the accustomed manner.”142 In laymen’s terms, people will
accept a given social and political arrangement as ‘legitimate’ so long as it bears the stamp of
legality.

A recent illustration of this attitude can be found in California Governor

Schwarzenneger’s reaction when the city of San Francisco issued marriage certificates for gay
couples: he said that he was neutral on the question of whether gays should be allowed to marry
or whether it should be restricted to heterosexuals, and he didn’t see it as a question of higher
principles, but merely insisted that city stop issuing licenses until the courts issued a clear rule
that gay marriage was legal. In his mind, legitimacy was conterminous with legality.143 As
Weber and other have pointed out, the collapse of legitimacy onto legality erases any critical
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distance: there is no ‘outside’ from which to declare the law illegitimate, reducing lawyers to
“specialists without spirit” who are stuck inside the “iron cage” of rationalized legal systems
without seeing their limits.144
This attitude (conflating legitimacy with legality) is a problem for corporate law because
it is extremely permissive. Virtually anything is legal, which means that virtually anything is
legitimate in the eyes of most observers. A corporation can have one director or twenty; it can
pay dividends every quarter or never; it can have one class of stock or five classes; it can pursue
elusive synergies in speculative mergers; it can have overseas sweatshops; and so on. The law is
so loose that it permits a corporation’s directors to enter into contracts that violate their duty of
loyalty to the company (say, by having the corporation hire their spouses as ‘consultants’) so
long as the transaction is deemed ‘fair.’145 Virtually anything is permissible so long as a nominal
business purpose can be ascribed to the behavior, something that is easily supplied by willing
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consultants. The practical effect of this is to consecrate the widest possible range of corporate
behavior as ‘legal’ and therefore ‘legitimate.’ This creates insurmountable difficulties when
trying to criticize corporate behavior, since virtually all behavior is de facto legitimate – tax
avoidance schemes, overseas sweatshops, outrageous perks for directors and officers, insider
transactions, and so forth.
To see how this works, take the question of executive compensation, which is set by the
board of directors under the rubric of their exercise of business judgment. The fiduciary duties
of care and loyalty would seem to mitigate against the awarding of excessive salaries to
executives, but in reality they do nothing to prevent it. The average CEO of a major corporation
now gets $10.8 million a year, an almost twenty-fold increase since 1981, and more than 400
times what an average worker makes.146 Such princely salaries are the product of winking and
nodding among a network of insiders: the board hires sympathetic consultants to suggest massive
salaries, and this fulfills the board’s requirement of seeking outside advice in their exercise of
business judgment, and the lawyers who draft the compensation packages defer to the board,
who are then reappointed for election by the very officers whom they have rewarded.147 This
146
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reached the height of absurdity when the Delaware Chancery Court refused to allow a lawsuit to
go forward against the Disney board of directors for approving a nearly $90 million severance
package for Michael Ovitz that was triggered after one year of disastrous service.148 When this
opinion came down, one law professor said to this author, “If this is allowed, then anything is
allowed” – and that is precisely the point: when everything is legal, then everything is
‘legitimate.’ This came to a head in the recent Tyco International scandal, where two executives
were paid half a billion dollars under suspicious circumstances, and their lawyer argued that
there couldn’t be any fraud involved since the transactions were fully disclosed and approved by
the board of directors, the accountants, and the lawyers: “The auditors knew what was going on .
. . There was no shredder or second set of books . . .[Everything was] on the books and records
of the company.”149 In other words, the injustice, the market failure, the absurdity had become
part of the system itself.
Corporate law operates from a baseline assumption of business judgement, which is
remarkable when we consider that businessmen in America have not always enjoyed this
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presumption.150

The so-called robber barons of the late Nineteenth Century created brutal

monopolies, crushed competitors, manipulated markets, lied to investors, intimidated judges, and
in some cases hired thugs to shoot striking workers.151 Much of this behavior was outlawed by
the corporate laws of the Twentieth Century, including the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Delaware
General Corporation Law, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934. What these
statutes do is to domesticate corporate behavior. The result is that we no longer have individual
robber barons that we look upon with suspicion, but multinational corporations that operate with
a presumption of legitimacy. How much have things really changed? Consider that Andrew
Carnegie locked union supporters out of his steel mills and erected barriers with gun holes in
case workers decided to storm the factory; nowadays Wal-Mart forces its ‘associates’ to watch
videos on the dangers of unions and has a squad of union-busters on twenty-four hour hotlines.152
We are inclined to think of the former as greedy and the latter as business savvy; the former as
illegitimate while the latter is just business. Historian Howard Zinn explains how the raw
conflicts are smoothed over and rationalized in the modern legal system:
The rule of law in modern society is no less authoritarian than the
150
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rule of men in pre-modern society; it enforces the maldistribution
of wealth and power as of old, but does this is such complicated
and indirect ways as to leave the observer bewildered: he who
traces back from cause to cause dies of old age inside the maze.
What was direct rule is now indirect rule. What was personal rule
is now impersonal. What was visible is now mysterious. What
was obvious exploitation when the peasant gave half his produce to
the lord is now the product of a complex market society enforced
by a library of statutes.153

The role of corporate law here is to christen corporate behavior as legal and therefore legitimate.
The reverse is also true: any demand for change in the existing corporate law is deemed a request
to move beyond the law and therefore is presumptively illegitimate.
The legitimating function of corporate law (specifically the Delaware General
Corporation Law and the federal securities laws) operates by presenting an idealized picture of
the modern corporation – a model that is not based on reality but on the idea of what a legitimate
system of power might look like. The basic idea is that of a consensual pyramid. At the bottom
are ideal shareholders who are rational, informed, and autonomous; they keep abreast of the
company by virtue of its disclosures under the federal securities laws. These shareholders come
together to elect directors as managers-fiduciaries at the annual meeting, and these directors
153
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appoint officers who prove their mettle by generating high returns. All the while, the directors
chosen by the shareholders act as fiduciaries to ensure that agents of the corporation act in its
best interests. If the shareholders choose to sell their stock or buy additional shares, they can rest
assured that the market is highly efficient, so the market price will reflect all relevant information
about the company.
This model has tremendous appeal for those who have a stake in perpetuating the
corporate system, such as members of the business elite and those who serve them. Indeed, there
are whole groups of corporate insiders (and scholars) who live inside the model, as it were.154 Of
course, this idealized picture constantly comes up short. In fact, the model gets refuted at every
turn. Most recently, a wave of corporate scandals made painfully clear that shareholders were
largely uninformed about what was really happening at companies, boards of directors were
clueless about wrongdoing by officers, lawyers and accountants were participants in frauds they
were supposed to detect, officers were manipulating stock prices to trigger their bonuses,
stockbrokers were pumping and dumping stocks – and all of this took place amid an irrational
stock bubble that the SEC and the stock exchanges didn’t lift a finger to stop. But rather than
discard the model, we are told (by the President no less) that the basic system is sound and that
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we merely need to plug a few holes that have been exploited by a few “bad apples.”155
The law, then, papers over corporate reality by translating corporate conduct into terms
that are palatable. As Barthes said, the law “depicts you as you should be, and not as you are.”156
In other words, the law is a master narrative that assigns each of us a role, it redescribes our
experiences in its own categories. Standing alone, this is not per se objectionable – all systems
rely on models and narratives – but a danger arises when the models and narratives become mere
official stories for the imposition of power.

The currently dominant master narrative of

corporate law is a story of informed shareholders, efficient markets, democratic corporations,
fiduciaries who act in the best interests of the corporation, and business entities who effectively
balance their commitments to justice and profit. This discourse holds allure for captains of
industry, corporate lawyers, consultants, and judges – all of whom stand to benefit from the
narrative. Outside of this small world of insiders are millions of people – workers, minorities, the
poor, activists – who find the narrative unbelievable.
In his masterpiece The Concept of Law, philosopher H.L.A. Hart mused about what a
pathological legal system would look like. He concluded that it would be a situation where a
small group of officials accepted the law as reasonable and morally binding while the great mass
of people subject to the law saw it as the naked expression of raw power by insiders and
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officials.157 This is precisely the situation of corporate law today: it is an attempt by corporate
insiders (and their priests and servants) to christen whatever they wish to do as rational, efficient,
and wrapped in a presumption of business judgment.

Conclusion
I have been arguing that a great deal of corporate law is better understood through the
lens of culture than the lens of economics, and that corporate law must be situated against other
cultural institutions and narratives. As a “legal fiction,”158 the corporation is created by symbols
and texts, a feature that it shares with other symbol-laden aspects of our culture, including
religion, folklore, literature, politics, and history.159 On my reading, the modern corporation
resembles a deity, and corporate law has strong parallels with mythology. In particular, the
corporation functions as an empty signifier which absorbs the contradictory forces of our culture,
157
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specifically our demands for capitalism and justice. My general point is that corporations are
imbricated within broader symbolic systems (texts and institutions) and should not be understood
solely as one-dimensional economic engines.
By advocating a ‘cultural turn’ in corporate legal scholarship, I hope to shift the dialogue
away from the law and economics approach that currently dominates scholarship on the
corporation. The timing is right for a shift away from economic models, given that the recent
corporate scandals – Enron, WorldCom, GlobalCrossing, Adelphia – laid bare the poverty of law
and economics. It turns out that the system was broken at every possible level – illegal insider
deals, bogus accounting, complicit attorneys, useless boards, deceptive disclosures, corrupt stock
analysts, conniving mutual fund managers, all amid a modern Tulipmania. A seven trillion
dollar disaster, an orgy of greed and lawbreaking, cannot be captured with terms like
‘rationality,’ ‘efficiency,’ and ‘transparent markets.’ A deeper problem with viewing corporate
governance in economic terms is that it ignores the fundamental tenet that all lawmaking is
profoundly symbolic and textual, that corporate action takes place against a backdrop of shared
meanings about the nature of a corporation, its relation to the state, its purpose, its powers and
limits. John Dewey made this point long ago by explaining that the whole question of corporate
personality (i.e., whether a corporation is a ‘person’) depends on “non-legal considerations:
considerations popular, historical, political, moral, philosophical, metaphysical, and in
connection with the latter, theological.”160
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suggested that legal studies undertake an interpretive turn, “away from functionalist thinking
about law . . . and a shift toward hermeneutic thinking about it.”161 This requires taking
corporate law and corporate behavior as texts that need to be deconstructed.

This has

revolutionary implications for corporate scholars – they need to put down the volumes by Coase
and Posner and instead start reading Geertz, Gramsci, Freud, Marx, and others who see behavior
as irreducibly symbolic. The pressing issues of corporate law – whether a corporation should
resemble a functioning democracy, whether it has duties to a community, whether it should be
allowed to move offshore, whether it has a race or gender, whether it has rights to free speech,
whether it must favor shareholders over employees, and so forth – are questions about the
meaning of the modern corporation. This article has been one attempt to get at the deep cultural
meaning of the American corporation by viewing it as a modern deity.

Hopefully others will

view the corporation through the lens of cultural studies, history, literary criticism, sociology,
and so forth, to balance out the economic approach that so dominates corporate scholarship.
By describing the corporation as a modern deity and by characterizing corporate law as
mythology, it is not my intention of somehow blazing a path beyond mythology, where corporate
law would be solidly placed on a foundation of rationality – logos instead of mythos.162 To be
161

CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 232 (1983).

162

The operative question to be explored is whether logos can ever be fully separated itself

from mythos – or whether this separation is itself merely another myth. See PAUL RICOEUR, Myth as the
Bearer of Possible Worlds, A RICOEUR READER 482, 486 (Mario Valdes ed., 1991)(“If we take the
relation of mythos and logos in the Greek experience, we could say that myth has been absorbed by the
logos, but never completely so; for the claim of the logos to rule over mythos is itself a mythical claim.

72

sure, there is an intellectual tradition associated with the Enlightenment which holds that myths
(and religion) are a type of error which can be overcome with rationality, and that once we
realize we have created our own myths, we will abandon such illusions and deal directly with
social reality instead of mediating through myths. The problem with this view, frankly, is that
there is no evidence of any person or society ever reaching such a post-mythical stage. For
example, Marxism called for abandoning bourgeois myths in favor of ‘scientific’ socialism, but
ended up reverting to equally absurd myths (‘the new Soviet man,’ ‘the withering away of the
state,’ ‘iron laws of history’).163 Rather than ridicule this failure, we should be humble and
accept a certain intractable dimension to myth. The point is not to get beyond myth, but to adopt
Nietzsche’s suggestion that myths are a ‘transfiguring mirror’ in which we can face our deepest
conflicts.
Anyone who reads corporate law as a cultural text will be struck by the endless
contradictions between our commitment to the pursuit of profit and to ensuring justice and
fairness. The question to be asked is whether these factors are adequately balanced within
corporate law, and here is where Duncan Kennedy’s comments on the mediating effect of law
are relevant:
[Law] mediates with a bias toward the existing social and
economic order. It asserts that we have overcome the fundamental
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contradiction through our existing practices.

Or that we can

achieve that blissful state through minor adjustments of a legal
regime that is basically sound, and needs only a little tinkering to
make it perfect. Or that there are many and serious flaws in the
existing order that we can remedy by bringing our tawdry practice
into line at last with our noble (non-contradictory) ideals.164
So the skewed mediation (biased toward the existing order) creates the impression that a neutral
body of law has sanctified the world as it exists, thereby lending it an aura of legitimacy
The poverty of the existing corporate mythology is obvious from the absurdities and
doublespeak that it creates: we have ‘elections’ in a ‘corporate democracy’ where one party
always wins; we have articles of incorporation and bylaws that form a ‘contract’ even though
shareholders have not agreed to them in advance; we have ‘transparency’ in the guise of
indecipherable documents that no one reads; we have ‘constituency’ statutes that don’t force
directors to take account of constituencies; we have ‘annual meetings’ where no one really
meets; we have corporate personality without any of the burdens of personhood; we have
systems to avoid double taxation yet most corporations pay no taxes in the first place and can
move offshore to avoid taxation; and we have gatekeepers like lawyers and accountants who
often participate in the very frauds that they are supposed to detect. All of this would be a
harmless comedy of errors if it didn’t affect the lives of hundreds of millions of Americans.
When Barthes suggests that myths can be challenged by insisting on the “responsible idea of
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language,”165 he was envisioning precisely this situation where a system clings to power (and
reveals its weakness) in the proliferation of empty buzzwords.
Beyond the responsible use of language, it is also a question of the responsible use of
imagination. If mythical thinking is necessary as a substratum of corporate law, and we must
rely on our imagination to dream up new entities, new rules, and new institutions, then we have
the right to demand that these creations are brought into harmony with fundamental values. The
creative people who dreamt up new entities such as the Limited Liability Company and the
Family Limited Partnership can surely use their imagination to dream up a new form of business
law that balances the demands of capitalism and justice in a way that doesn’t shortchange
workers, destroy the environment, and concentrate wealth in the hands of a tiny elite. This is
another way of saying that our myths, our own creations, should not grant legitimacy to a system
that cripples so many of us.
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